The starting point for this overview is the two chapters on trade agreements in the previous volume of the Handbook of International Economics (1995), namely Robert Staiger`s chapter “International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy” and the chapter “Regional Economic Integration” by Richard Baldwin and Anthony Venables. For the most part, I will focus on the progress of the literature on post-1995 trade agreements; I refer the reader to the previous volume of this pre-1995 literature textbook. The exemption from the customs union was intended to take account of the creation of the European Economic Community (EC) in 1958. The European Commission, which originally consisted of six European countries, is now known as the European Union (EU) and comprises twenty-seven European countries. The EU has gone beyond simply removing barriers to trade between Member States and forming a customs union. It has moved towards even greater economic integration by becoming a common market – a regime that removes obstacles to the mobility of factors of production such as capital and labour between participating countries. As a common market, the EU also coordinates and harmonises the fiscal, industrial and agricultural policies of different countries. In addition, many EU members have formed a single currency area by replacing their national currency with the euro. As a general rule, the benefits and obligations of trade agreements apply only to their signatories. Maggi (1999) develops a simple trilateral business model in which each country negotiates a pair of relationship-specific products on which any government can impose import duties. To curb the use of terms-of-trade import tariffs, Maggi is examining a simple trigger strategy that uses a permanent static reversal of Nash in retaliation for cooperative tariff defectors.

The analysis shows that the application of multilateral sanctions only allows for a higher level of cooperation if “bilateral power imbalances exist in the sense that partners could lose different amounts in any bilateral relationship through a tariff war.” In the absence of such imbalances, triggering a multilateral tariff war against deviations does not strengthen punitive power, since each government sets its static optimal tariffs against all its trading partners if it deviates from them; The incentive limit for the establishment of a cooperative tariff under the bilateral penal system (16) remains unchanged if both sides of the inequality are multiplied by a positive natural One of the difficulties of the WTO system in recent years has been the problem of maintaining and expanding the liberal world trading system. Multilateral negotiations on trade liberalization are progressing very slowly and the demand for consensus among the many WTO members limits the scope of trade reform agreements. As Mike Moore, a new Director-General of the WTO, said, the organization is like a car with an accelerator and 140 handbrakes. While multilateral efforts have reduced tariffs on industrial products, they have had much less success in liberalizing trade in agriculture, textiles and clothing, as well as in other areas of international trade. Recent negotiations, such as the Doha Development Round, have encountered problems and their ultimate success is uncertain. However, some concerns have been expressed by the WTO. According to Pascal Lamy, Director-General of the WTO, the dissemination of regional trade agreements (RTAs) is “.

is concern – concern about inconsistency, confusion, exponentially rising costs for businesses, unpredictability and even injustice in business relations. “[2] The WTO is of the view that while typical trade agreements (designated by the WTO as preferential or regional) are useful to some extent, it is much more advantageous to focus on global agreements within the WTO framework, such as the negotiations in the current Doha Round. The most important free trade areas are the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This concludes my stylized portrait of recent developments in trade agreements, and in this context, I now turn to my discussion of recent advances in the scientific literature on trade agreements. A government does not have to take specific measures to promote free trade. .